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Abstract. In recent years, the adaptation of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) to application areas requiring mobility increased the security
threats against confidentiality, integrity and privacy of the information
as well as against their connectivity. Since, key management plays an
important role in securing both information and connectivity, a proper
authentication and key management scheme is required in mobility en-
abled applications where the authentication of a node with the network is
a critical issue. In this paper, we present an authentication and key man-
agement scheme supporting node mobility in a heterogeneous WSN that
consists of several low capabilities sensor nodes and few high capabili-
ties sensor nodes. We analyze our proposed solution by using MATLAB
(analytically) and by simulation (OMNET++ simulator) to show that
it has less memory requirement and has good network connectivity and
resilience against attacks compared to some existing schemes. We also
propose two levels of secure authentication methods for the mobile sensor
nodes for secure authentication and key establishment.
Key words: Wireless sensor networks, Cryptography, Key Management
1 Introduction
The Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) are usually deployed in possibly remote
and unattended locations they are definitely prone to security attacks. Hence to
secure the network operation and securely gather and forward the information,
security threats and its counter measures should be considered at design time
in terms of both requirements and implementation techniques. The design of
security algorithms considering the homogeneous sensor networks was the first
step to secure sensor networks. However, some research work [1], [2] have shown
that homogeneous sensor networks have high communication and computation
overheads, high storage requirements and suffer from severe performance bot-
tlenecks. Hence, recent research work [3], [4] introduced heterogeneous sensor
networks, which consists of High-end sensors nodes (H-sensors) and Low-end
sensors nodes (L-sensors). To achieve better performance and scalability, H-
sensors have more resources compared to L-sensors. However, both H-Sensors
and L-sensors are still highly vulnerable in nature and are exposed to several
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security threats and particularly prone to physical attacks. Thus, proper security
mechanisms should be applied to protect these nodes against attacks. Hence, a
novel key management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks suitable for
scenarios with partial mobility is presented. The proposed solution relies on two
types of keys: authentication keys and secret communication codes used to gen-
erate secret keys whenever needed. The remaining of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents existing work. Section 3 describes the proposed key
management scheme, while in Section 4 describe the security analysis of the
proposed scheme, and finally conclusions are provided in section 5.
2 Related Work
To secure wireless sensor networks, Perrig [5] proposed SPINS, in which there
a secure central entity called server which is responsible for establishing a key
among the sensor nodes. Since it is based on centralized base station approach,
the failure of base station severely affects the performance of network. To over-
come the above mentioned issue, a randomly key distributed approach is pro-
posed by Eschenauer and Gligor [3]. In this scheme, there is no centralized entity
like a base station for key distribution and management. Each node in the net-
work is assigned a set of randomly selected keys from a large key set. Since the
keys are distributed randomly, the two communicating nodes need to have at
least one common key in their sets for secure communication. To further im-
prove the network security, sharing of at least q-keys concept for establishing
a secret key is introduced by Chan [6]. The prior knowledge of node’s deploy-
ment in the network helps in increasing the network connectivity and reduce the
memory requirements [7] combined with the Rabin’s scheme [15]. To achieve bet-
ter security and network connectivity with less memory requirements with low
computational cost, NPKPS scheme is proposed by Zhang [8] for wireless sen-
sor networks. To reduce the memory cost, Kim [9] introduced a level-based key
management scheme while a two-layered dynamic key management for clustered
based wireless sensor networks is presented by Chuang [10].
The management of secret keys (MASY) protocol is presented by Maerien in
[11] which is based on the trust assumption among the networks managers/base
stations. To further improve the network connectivity and reduce the memory
requirements of the symmetric key distribution approaches, Du [4] presents an
asymmetric key pre-distribution (AP) approach. Du sensor network model con-
sists of two different types of nodes making it a Heterogeneous Sensor Networks
(HSNs). This assumption significantly increases the network connectivity and
reduces memory requirements compared to the existing symmetric key manage-
ment approaches. Lu [12] proposes a framework for key management schemes
in distributed peer-to-peer wireless sensor networks with heterogeneous sensor
nodes and shows by simulation that heterogeneity results in higher connectivity
and higher resilience. Du [13] proposes a routing-driven key management scheme
for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
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phy (ECC), which provides better security with significant reduction of memory
overhead.
The considered network model is a Heterogeneous Sensor Network (HSN)
composed base station and H-sensors (fixed) while L-sensors are Mobile Nodes
(MNs). The virtual network organization is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Virtual network architecture
CH: Cluster Head MN: Mobile Node
FN: Fixed Node KPmain: Main large key pool
KPFN : Sub key pool for Fixed Nodes KPMN : Sub key pool for Mobile Nodes
Kplc: Public key Kprt: Private key
prand(): Prime number generator AUTH: Authentication code
PRM: Generated prime number SPMN : Scalar product of a Mobile Node
SPFN : Scalar product of a Fixed Node SCC: Secret communication code
3 Proposed Scheme
First we describe a list of abbreviations used in the proposed solution. Since
the proposed key management scheme is built on top of the above network
model to provide effective authentication and dynamic key establishment. The
key material is generated at the BS. More specifically, a large key pool KPmail
is created and then divided into two sub key pools KPFN and KPMN such that
KPFN ∩KPFN = ∅.
The key pool KPFN is used by the FNs of the network while the key pool
KPMN is used by the MNs of the network for the secret key establishment. For
authentication purposes, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used during the
initialization phase for key generation. Three different phases have been taken
into account
1. Key pre-distribution to the different sensor nodes i.e. FNs and MNs
2. Node authentication
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3. Communication key establishment among the nodes within the network
Further details will be provided in the following subsections.
3.1 Key Pre-Distribution
As already mentioned, in our proposed scheme, the key material is organized
at the BS in a large key pool KPmain which is then randomly divided into key
pool KPFN and into key pool KPMN such that KPFN ∩ KPMN = ∅. Now
each FN i is assigned a randomly selected key pool KPFNi from the key pool
KPFN where KPFNi << KPFN and contains |KPFNi | keys while each MN j is
assigned a randomly selected key pool KPMNj from the key pool KPMN where
KPMNj << KPMN and contains |KPMNj | keys. Since these two key pools are
disjoint, KPFNi ∩ KPMNj = ∅. These assigned key pools will be used by the
FNs and by the MNs for the establishment of a secret communication key using
the assigned key generation algorithm.
Concerning the authentication key material, each FN and each MN is as-
signed an elliptic curve E(a, b) over a finite Galois field F (G) and a base point
G along with a unique authentication code AUTH. Each FN and each MN is
also assigned an ECC-based public/private key pair (Kplc,Kprt) and a prime
number generator (prand()).
As previously described, FNs and the BS compose the fixed infrastructure of
the overall heterogeneous sensor network; they are powerful devices and play an
important role in authentication and key management. In order to maintain the
availability of these services and to avoid the full network being compromised
by attackers, a higher level of security is thus required for FNs and the BS. As a
consequence, the authentication of FNs to the network and the communication
between the FNs and between a FN and the BS will be based on a standard
ECC-based private/public key mechanism. Accordingly, each FN has its own
private key and the public key of the BS and of all the other FNs of the network.
At the same time, the BS has the public keys of all the FNs.
All the previously introduced key material is transferred to each node of
the network by means of secure side channels. Then, after this pre-distribution
phase, the specific key material assigned to each type of node of the network is
as follows:
– the BS owns all the key material that needs to be pre-distributed (plus, as
already described, the public key of each FN)
– each FN i has been given E(a, b), G and AUTHi for authentication purposes
and key pool KPFNi for communication key establishment
– each MN j has been given E(a, b), G and AUTHj for authentication purposes
and KPMNj for communication key establishment
3.2 Node Authentication
After the deployment and key pre-distribution phase, each FN of the network
broadcasts periodic Hello messages. This mechanism enables each FN to fill a
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table with all neighboring MNs. The FN ID is included in the Hello message
along with a random nonce signed by the FN’s private key. Upon the reception
of those Hello messages, each MN selects a FN as its Cluster Head (CH), e.g.
the one with the highest signal strength, after the verification of Hello message
by using the FN public key. Since Hello message verification is a part of the
authentication phase, at this point the authentication phase among the FNs and
the MNs can start. To this aim, each MNj authenticates the Hello message of
the selected FNi as a CH as follow: First MNj uses the FNi ID and generates
a prime number PRMFNi using the prime number generator prand()
PRMFNj = prand(IDFNi) (1)
After the generation of PRMFNi , the MNj generates the public key of the FNi
using the scalar multiplication as
Kplc = (PRMFNi + IDFNi) •G (2)
Then the MNj can verify the Hello message signature. Successful verification of
the Hello message signature authenticates the CH i.e. FNi to the MNj . The MN
then calculates the scalar product of the assigned authentication code AUTHj
and its private key as
SPMNj =
(
AUTHj + IDMNj
) •Kprt (3)
Then the MNj sends a joining request including its ID, SPMNj , and the nonce
it had received from the CH back to its selected CH, all signed by its private key.
After receiving the MNj ’s joining request message, the FNi first authenticates
MNj before registering it as a trusted cluster member. The FNi follows the same
procedure as the MNj did to check the authenticity of the received messages.
First the FNi use the MNj ID and generate a prime number PRMMNj using
the prime number generator prand()
PRMMNj = prand(IDMNj ) (4)
After the generation of PRMMNj , the FNi generates the public key of the MNj
using scalar multiplication as
Kplc =
(
PRMMNj + IDMNj
) •G (5)
After the generation of the MNj public key, the FNi verifies the joining message
signature. Successful verification and reception of the correct nonce ensure that
the MNj is an authentic mobile node belonging to the network. The CH registers
this MNj into its authentic MN member list and calculates the scalar product
of AUTHi and its private key as
SPFNi = (AUTHi + IDFNi) •Kprt (6)
Finally the CH generates an authentication certificate for this MN using SPMNj
and SPFNi as
Authentication Certificate = SPMNj • SPFNi mod G (7)
The CH sends SPFNi to the MNj which uses in the secret key generation and
for the authentication certificate generation.
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3.3 Communication Key Establishment
Once the MN and CH/FN authenticate each other successfully, the key estab-
lishment phase starts. During this phase, the MN sends one of its secret commu-
nication codes SCC1, randomly selected from KPMN and encrypted by the CH
public key to its CH as described above. The CH also selects randomly another
secret communication code SCC2 from its pool KPFN and sends it to the cor-
responding MN. After the reception of this secret code by the MN, the MN and
the FN both have the same SCC1 and SCC2 and are able to generate a secret
key using these two codes, SPMNj and SPFNi using [?] as
Secret Key = SCC1 • SCC2 mod (SPMNj • SPFNi) (8)
Once a secret key is established between the CH and each MN, the CH has
assigned a Shared Secret Code (SSC) to its all member MNs. This shared secret
code is updated both periodically and when a MN compromission is detected.
Since the MNs move in the network to perform their duties, they may need to
establish a secure communication link also with neighboring MNs, possibly very
frequently due to their movement within the network. In order to keep track
of their neighboring MNs, each MN broadcasts a short range Hello message to
know about its neighboring MNs. To establish a secret key with a neighboring
MN, both MNs will share their secret communication code IDs assigned to them
as KPMN . Now both the MNs will find the maximum number of shared codes
with one another and will generate a secret key using all of them as
Secret Key =
f∏
l=1
SCC1l mod SSC (9)
Where ’f’ represents the total number of common secret communication codes.
Since the distributions of the SCC1 codes to the MNs is random and proba-
bilistic, two neighboring MNs might not have any secret communication code in
common. In this case, to avoid any discontinuity, the MNs will use the assigned
Shared Secret Code (SSC) from their common CH and their IDs to establishment
a secret key with its neighboring MNs. For example, if MNm wants to establish
a secret key with MNn but these two nodes do not have any common secret
communication code (SCC), then they establish a secret key by first calculating
and sharing L and K with each other as
L = prand(IDMNn) • SPMNm •AUTHm • SSC mod G (10)
K = prand(IDMNm) • SPMNn •AUTHn • SSC mod G (11)
Secret key = L •K mod SSC (12)
4 Security Evaluation
4.1 Denial of Service Attack
In this section we describe some kind of Denial of Service attacks (DoS attacks)
that can be brought against our proposed scheme, as well as possible counter
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measures. The main objective of DoS attacks is to make the resources unavailable
to an intended user of the network.
1. FN Hello messages: The first possible DOS attack against the proposed
scheme is to broadcast Hello messages pretending to be a FN of the network
to exhaust the resources of the MNs. Since each Hello message is signed by
the private key of the FN, MNs will verify it using the public key of that
FN. Since the adversary FN is not an authentic node, the MN would not be
able to verify that Hello message and once a MN detects this attack, it will
inform its other neighboring authentic FNs. The authentic FNs would then
inform the BS and neighboring MNs about this fake FN ID so that they can
avoid the messages from that node.
2. MN Hello messages: When a MN finds its current CH signal strength value
below a threshold value, it starts broadcasting the MN Hello messages to
know about its new neighboring FNs. The attacker can launch such MN
Hello message broadcast attack by introducing a fake MN. Since the MN
Hello broadcast message is also signed by the MN private key, the new FNs
first verify it by using the MN public key. This would not be possible for
a fake MN. Thus the FNs inform the BS and other neighboring FNs about
this malicious MN.
4.2 Sybil Attack
Sybil attacks are those in which a malicious node illegitimately taking on mul-
tiple identities. We call the nodes performing these attacks as sybil nodes. Sybil
attacks can be of different forms e.g. using direct or indirect communication and
fabricated or stolen identities. In the direct communication sybil attacks, a Sybil
node communicates directly with a legitimate node. But since, in the proposed
scheme, the sybil node is first authenticated by sending a message signed with its
private key, the FN would not be able to authenticate it. In the indirect commu-
nication sybil attacks, malicious node (who deploy sybil nodes in the network)
becomes a router for forwarding the communication to the Sybil node from the
FN which is not possible in the proposed scheme because each MN is the end
user of the network. In the fabricated sybil attacks, the attacker assigns an un-
use identity to the sybil node. In this case, this sybil node needs to authenticate
itself to the FNs which would again not be possible in the proposed scheme as
described above. Stolen identity based sybil attacks are very dangerous in such
resource constrained networks. But this type of sybil attack does not affect the
proposed scheme because each communication is encrypted with the key agreed
already with the original node having this ID, and the sybil node does not have
these keys.
In the key pre-distribution approach, if every MN is assigned KPMN keys
and every FN is assigned KPFN keys from a key pool of size KPmain and an
attacker compromises ’c’ nodes to create a compromised key pool of size ’n’,
then the probability of a sybil node to be successful created is
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Prsybil node =
KPMN∑
t=1
(
n
t
)(
KPmain−n
KPMN−t
)(
KPmain
KPMN
) (KPmain−KPMN+tKPMN )(
KPmain
KPMN
) (13)
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Probability of generation sybil nodes
Fig. 2 shows the probability of successfully generated sybil nodes in the pro-
posed scheme compared with scheme [7],[9].
4.3 Node Compromission
Each node is secured by hardware means against access to its keys. However, no
such scheme is ever perfect; hence here we analyze the effects of such attacks on
our key management scheme.
In existing key pre-distribution schemes for both homogeneous and hetero-
geneous sensor networks, each node is assigned a key pool, and for secure com-
munication the two nodes must have a shared common key. In that case, once
the node is compromised by an adversary, it can compromise all the secure links
with neighbors with whom this node has a shared key. Thus the total number
of communication links compromised by capturing c MNs are given by
P [Compromised] = 1− (1− KPMNj
KPMN
)c (14)
Where |KPMNj | is the number of keys stored in the MN and |KPMN | is the size
of the authentication key pool from which KPMNj is randomly selected for each
MN. Figure 3 shows both the analytical and OMNET++ simulation results of
the effect of this kind of attack on our proposed scheme compared with the key
pre-distribution scheme in [3], [4], [8], [16]. The graph shows that our scheme
provides almost, 100% resilience against this kind of attack.
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Fig. 3. Network resilience against compromised mobile nodes
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new authentication and key management scheme
for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks including mobile nodes. The proposed key
management scheme is based on two different types of the key pools i.e. an
authentication key pool and a communication key pool. Based on these pools,
a key pre-distribution mechanism has been defined. The results showed that
the two considered key pools provide better security. Furthermore, the proposed
solution provides better network resilience against attacks compared to the other
reference protocols considered.
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